In this paper we assess the economic viability of innovation by producers relative to two 
From Producer Innovation to Open User and Collaborative Innovation

Introduction and overview
Ever since Schumpeter (1934) promulgated his theory of economic development, economists, policymakers and business managers have assumed that the dominant mode of innovation is a "producers' model." That is, it has been assumed that most important designs for innovations would originate from producers and be supplied to consumers via goods and services that were for sale. This view seemed reasonable on the face of it -producer-innovators generally profit from many users, each purchasing and using a single, producer-developed design. Individual user innovators, in contrast, depend only on their own in-house use of their design to recoup their innovation-related investments. Presumably, therefore, a producer serving many customers can afford to invest more in an innovation design than can any single user. From this it has been generally assumed that producer-developed designs should dominate user-developed designs in most parts of the economy.
This long-held view of innovation has, in turn, led to public policies based on a theory of producer incentives. Producers, it is argued, are motivated to innovate by the expectation of profits. These profits will disappear if anyone can simply copy producers' innovations, and therefore, producers must be granted subsidies or intellectual property rights that give them exclusive control over their innovations for some period of time. (Machlup and Penrose, 1951; Teece, 1986; Gallini and Scotchmer, 2006.) However, the producers' model is only one mode of innovation. Two increasingly important additional models are innovations by single user firms or individuals, and open collaborative innovation projects. Each of these three forms represents a different way to organize human effort and investments aimed at generating valuable new innovations. In the body of this paper we will analyze these three models in terms of their technological properties, specifically their design costs and architecture, and their communication requirements. In these two technological dimensions, each model has a different profile that gives it economic advantages under some conditions and disadvantages in others.
Our modeling of design costs and architectures and communication costs allows us to place bounds on the contexts in which each model will be economically viable. Our analysis will lead us to conclude that innovation by individual users and also open collaborative innovation are modes of innovating that increasingly compete with and may displace producer innovation in many parts of the economy. This shift is being driven by new technologies, specifically the transition to increasingly digitized and modularized design and production practices, coupled with the availability of very low-cost, Internet-based communication.
We will argue that when it is technologically feasible, the transition from closed producer or single user innovation to open single user or collaborative innovation is also desirable in terms of social welfare, hence worthy of support by policymakers. This is due to the free dissemination of innovation designs associated with the open model. Open innovation generates innovation without exclusivity or monopoly, and so should improve social welfare other things equal.
In section 2 of this paper we review relevant literature. In section 3 we present and explain conditions under which each of the three economic models of innovation we describe is viable. In section 4, we discuss some broader patterns related to our models, and also suggest some implications of open collaborative innovation for researchers, practitioners, and policymakers.
Literature review
In this section, we briefly review the literature on user innovation, on openness of intellectual property, and on modular designs and collaborative innovation.
Innovation by users
Users, as we define the term, are firms or individual consumers that expect to benefit from using a design, a product or a service. In contrast, producers expect to benefit from selling a design, a product, or a service. Innovation user and innovation producer are thus two general "functional" relationships between innovator and innovation. Users are unique in that they alone benefit directly from innovations. Producers must sell innovation-related products or services to users, hence the value of innovation to producers is derived from users' willingness to pay. Thus, in order to profit, inventors must sell or license knowledge related to their new designs; manufacture and sell goods embodying the innovations; or deliver and sell services incorporating or complementing the innovations.
Qualitative observations have long indicated that important process improvements are developed by employees working for firms that use them. Adam Smith (1776) pointed out the importance of "the invention of a great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labor, and enable one man to do the work of many." Smith went on to note that "a great part of the machines made use of in those manufactures in which labor is most subdivided, were originally the invention of common workmen, who, being each of them employed in some very simple operation, naturally turned their thoughts towards finding out easier and readier methods of performing it." Rosenberg (1976) studied the history of the US machine tool industry and found that important and basic machine types like lathes and milling machines were first developed and built by user firms having a strong need for them. Textile manufacturing firms, gun manufacturers and sewing machine manufacturers were important early user developers of machine tools.
Quantitative studies of user innovation document that many of the most important and novel products and processes commercialized in a range of fields are developed by users for inhouse use. Thus, Enos (1962) reported that nearly all the most important innovations in oil refining were developed by user firms. Freeman (1968) found that the most widely licensed chemical production processes were developed by user firms. Von Hippel (1976 Hippel ( , 1977 found that users were the developers of about 80 percent of the most important scientific instrument innovations, and also the developers of most of the major innovations in semiconductor processing. Pavitt (1984) found that a considerable fraction of invention by British firms was for in-house use. Shah (2000) found that the most commercially important equipment innovations in four sporting fields tended to be developed by individual users.
Empirical studies also show that many users-from 10 percent to nearly 40 percentengage in developing or modifying products. This has been documented in the case of several specific types of industrial products and consumer products (Urban and von Hippel 1988 , Herstatt and von Hippel 1992 , Morrison et al. 2000 , Lüthje et al. 2002 , Lüthje 2003 , Franke and von Hippel 2003 , Franke and Shah 2003 . It has also been documented in large-scale, multiindustry surveys of process innovation in both Canada and the Netherlands (Arundel and Sonntag 1999 , Gault and von Hippel 2009 , de Jong and von Hippel 2009 ).
When taken together, the findings of all these empirical studies make it very clear that users have long been and are doing a lot of commercially-signficant process development and product modification in many fields.
2.2: Innovation openness
Economic theorists have long thought that uncompensated "spillovers" of proprietary innovation-related knowledge developed by private investment will reduce innovators' expected profits from innovation investments -and so reduce their willingness to invest. Accordingly, many nations have long offered intellectual property rights grants that afford inventors some level of temporary monopoly control over their inventions. The assumption has been that losses incurred due to intellectual property rights grants will be more than offset by gains from related increases in innovation investment or innovation disclosure (Machlup and Penrose 1950 , Penrose 1951 , Foray 2004 .
Given this argument, empirical research should show innovators striving to keep information on their innovations from being freely diffused. However, research instead shows that both individuals and firms often voluntarily "freely reveal" what they have developed.
When we say that an innovator freely reveals information about an innnovation, we mean that exclusive intellectual property rights to that information are voluntarily given up by the innovator, and all interested parties are given access to it-the information becomes a public good (Harhoff et al 2003) . (Intellectual property rights may still be used to protect the developers of these public goods from liability, and to prevent expropriation of their innovations by third parties (O'Mahony 2003) .)
The practices visible in open source software development were important in bringing the phenomenon of free revealing to general awareness. In these projects it was clear policy that project contributors would routinely and systematically freely reveal code they had developed at private expense (Raymond 1999) . However, free revealing of innovations has a history that began long before the advent of open source software. Allen (1983) and Nuvolari (2004) , describe and discuss eighteenth-century examples. Contemporary free revealing by users has been documented by von Hippel and Finkelstein (1979) for medical equipment, by Lim (2000) for semiconductor process equipment, by Morrison, Roberts, and von Hippel (2000) for library information systems, and by Franke and Shah (2003) for sporting equipment. Gault and de Jong and have shown in multi-industry studies in Canada and the Netherlands that user firms developing process equipment often transfer their innovations to process equipment suppliers without charge.
Reexaminations of traditional economic arguments triggered by evidence of free revealing show that innovators generally freely reveal for two economically rational reasons.
First, it is in practice difficult to effectively protect most innovations via secrecy or intellectual property rights. Second, significant private benefits often accrue to innovators that do freely reveal their innovations.
With respect to the first point, consider that the real-world value of patent protection has been studied for more than 40 years. A number of researchers have found that, except in the case of pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and chemical processes, innovators generally do not think that patents are very useful either for excluding imitators or for capturing royalties. Most respondents also say that the availability of patent protection does not induce them to invest more in research and development than they would if patent protection did not exist (Taylor and Silberston, 1973; Levin et al. 1987; Mansfield 1968 Mansfield , 1985 Cohen et al 2000 Cohen et al , 2002 Arundel 2001; Sattler 2003; Dosi et. al., 2006) . Keeping an innovation secret is also unlikely to be successful for long -trade secrets tend to "leak" quite quickly (Mansfield 1985) . And even if one innovator can manage to protect a trade secret, many generally know similar information that can serve as substitutes. Some holders of substitute information stand to lose little or nothing by freely revealing what they know. As a result, efforts of those who wish to protect or hide their trade secrets are often undercut by those with the least to lose by free revealing (von Hippel 2005) .
With respect to the second point, evidence has now accumulated that innovators who elect to freely reveal their innovations, can gain significant private benefits -and also avoid some private costs.
Regarding private benefits, consider that innovators that freely reveal their new designs often find that others then improve or suggest improvements to the innovation, to mutual benefit (Raymond 1999, Lakhani and . Freely revealing users also may benefit from enhancement of reputation, from positive network effects due to increased diffusion of their innovation, and from other factors such as obtaining a source of supply for their innovation that is cheaper than in-house production (Allen 1983 , Lerner and Tirole 2002 , Harhoff et al. 2003 , Lakhani and Wolf 2005 , von Hippel and von Krogh 2003 .
With regard to cost, protecting design information is generally expensive, requiring security walls and restricted access or the enforcement of intellectual property rights (Blaxill and Eckardt, 2009) . For this reason preventing others from viewing and using a new design may be significantly more costly than leaving the design open for inspection or use by any interested party (Baldwin, 2008) .
Not surprisingly, the incentive to freely reveal decreases if the agents compete with one another, for example, if they are firms making the same end product or individuals competing in a sport (Franke and Shah, 2003; Baldwin, Hienerth and von Hippel, 2006) . Selective openness strategies illustrate this point nicely. Thus, Henkel (2003) has documented selective free revealing among producers in the case of embedded Linux software. The producers partition their code into open modules on which they collaborate, and closed modules on which they compete (Henkel and Baldwin, 2009 ).
Collaboration and Modularity
Collaboration is a well-known attribute of online, multi-contributor projects such as open source software projects and Wikipedia (Raymond, 1999; Benkler, 2002) . Lakhani and von Hippel (2009) studied a sample of 241 software features being developed for the improvement of PostgreSQL open source database software. They found that the average number of individuals collaborating in the development of a single software feature was 9, and that on average 7 of these were users. Franke and Shah (2003) studied user innovators in four sporting communities and found that all had received assistance in their development efforts by at least one other user from their communities. The average number of users assisting each userinnovator was three to five. Finally, a study of process equipment innovations by high-tech small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the Netherlands conducted by de Jong and von found that 24% of 364 user firms drawn from a wide range of industries had received assistance in their innovation development work from other process equipment users.
Modular design architectures are an important aid to collaborative work. A modular system is one in which the elements, which may be decisions, tasks or components, are partitioned into subsets called modules. Within each module, elements of the system are densely dependent and interconnected: changing any one will require changes in many others.
Across modules, however, elements are independent or nearly so; a change in one module by definition does not require changes in others (Baldwin and Clark, 2000) . Modular systems can be easily broken apart, thus Herbert Simon called such systems "near-decomposable" (Simon, 1962) . Furthermore, given appropriate knowledge, a non-modular system can be made modular (or near-decomposable) by creating a set of coordinating design rules that establish interfaces and regulate the interactions of the modules (Mead and Conway, 1980; Baldwin and Clark, 2000) . Most design-relevant knowledge and information does not need to cross module boundaries. This is the property of "information hiding" (Parnas 1972) .
Modularity is important for collaboration in design because separate modules can be worked on independently and in parallel, without intense ongoing communication across modules. Designers working on different modules in a large system do not have to be colocated, but can still create a system in which the parts can be integrated and will function together as a whole. In small projects or within modules, designers can utilize "actionable transparency" rather than modularity to achieve coordination. When projects are small, each designer's activities are "transparent" to his or her collaborators. In open collaborative projects, modularity and actionable transparency generally go hand in hand, with both factors contributing to the divisibility of tasks (Colfer, 2009 ).
Building on arguments of Ghosh (1998) , Raymond (1999) , and von Hippel and von Krogh (2003) , Baldwin and Clark (2006 b) showed formally that, if communication costs are low relative to design costs, then any degree of modularity suffices to cause rational innovators that do not compete with respect to the design being developed to prefer collaborative innovation over independent innovation. This result hinges on the fact that the innovative design itself is a non-rival good: each participant in a collaborative effort gets the value of the whole design, but incurs only a fraction of the design cost.
Where is Each Model Viable?
Previous work has demonstrated the existence of the three basic ways of organizing innovation activity and has eludicated their characteristics. However, to our knowledge, there has been no systematic thinking about the conditions under which each model is likely to appear, and whether each is expanding or contracting relative to the other two. To make progress on these questions, it is necessary to develop a theoretical framework that locates all three models in a more general space of attributes. That is our aim in this section.
Our methodololgy is that of comparative institutional analysis. In this diverse literature, laws, social customs, modes of governance, organizational forms, and industry structures are compared in terms of their incentives, economic consequences, and ability to survive and grow in a given historical setting or technological context. In the particular branch we are most concerned with, organizational forms and industry structures are taken to be endogenous and historically contingent (Chandler, 1962 (Chandler, , 1977 Williamson, 1985 Williamson, , 1991 Nelson and Winter, 1982; Aoki, 1984 Aoki, , 2001 Langlois, 1986a Langlois, , 2002 Baldwin and Clark 2000; Jacobides, 2005) . Different forms may be selected to suit different environments and then adaptively modified. Thus organizational forms emerge in history and recede as technologies and preferences change.
Our approach is modeled after Williamson's (1985 Williamson's ( , 1991 analysis of different forms of transactional governance and especially Fama and Jensen's (1983a, b) account of how agency costs affect the allocation of residual claims. However, in contrast to this prior work, we will not attempt to determine which model is most efficient in terms of minimizing transaction or agency costs, but instead will establish bounds on the viability of each model. When more than one form is viable, we do not expect to see one form drive out the other (as is the common assumption), but rather expect to see creative combinations of the forms to take advantage of what each one does best.
Finally in contrast to virtually all prior work except for Chandler (1962 Chandler ( , 1977 , we take an explicitly technological approach to the question of viability. Fundamentally we assume that in a free economy, the organizational forms that survive are ones with benefits exceeding their costs (Fama and Jensen, 1983a, b) . Costs in turn are determined by technology and change over time. Thus Chandler (1977) argues that the modern corporation became a viable form of organization (and the dominant form in some sectors) as a consequence of the (partly endogenous) decline in production costs for high-flow-through technologies, together with (exogenous) declines in transportation and energy costs. Adopting Chandler's logic, we should expect a particular organizational form to be prevalent when its technologically determined costs are low, and to be ascendent-i.e., growing relative to other forms-when its costs are declining relative to the costs of other forms.
Today, design costs and communication costs are declining rapidly, and modular design architectures are becoming common for many products. In the rest of this section, we argue that these largely exogenous technological trends make single user innovation and especially open collaborative innovation viable across a wider range of innovation activities than was the case before the arrival of technologies such as personal computers and the Internet. We have seen, and expect to continue to see, single user innovation and open collaborative innovation growing in importance relative to producer innovation in most sectors of the economy. We do not believe that producer innovation will disappear, but we do expect it to become less pervasive and ubiquitous than was the case during most of the 20 th century.
Definitions
A single user innovator is a single firm or individual that creates an innovation in order to use it. Examples are a single firm creating a process machine in order to use it, and an individual consumer creating a new piece of sporting equipment in order to use it.
A producer innovator is a single, non-collaborating firm. Producers anticipate profiting from their design by selling it to users or others: by definition they obtain no direct use-value from a new design. We assume that through secrecy or intellectual property rights a producer innovator has exclusive access and control over the innovation, and so is a monopolist with respect to its design. Examples of producer innovators are: (1) a firm or individual that patents an invention and licenses it to others; (2) a firm that develops a new process machine to sell to its customers; (3) a firm that develops an enhanced service to offer its clients.
An open collaborative innovation project involves contributors who share the work of generating a design and also reveal the outputs from their individual and collective design efforts openly for anyone to use. The defining properties of this model are twofold: (1) the participants are not rivals with respect to the innovative design (otherwise they would not collaborate) and (2) they do not individually or collectively plan to sell products or services incorporating the innovation or intellectual property rights related to it. An example of such a
project is an open source software project.
A design is a set of instructions that specify how to produce a novel product or service Suh, 1990; Baldwin and Clark, 2000, 2006a) . These instructions can be thought of as a recipe for accomplishing the functional requirements of the design (Suh, 1990; Winter, 2008; Dosi and Nelson, 2009 ). In the case of products or services that themselves consist of information such as software, a design for an innovation can be virtually identical to the usable product itself. In the case of a physical product such as a wrench or a car, the design recipe must be converted into a physical form before it can be used.
if the innovator or each participant in a group of innovators finds it worthwhile to incur the requisite costs to gain the anticipated value of the innovation. By focusing on anticipated benefits and costs we assume that potential innovators are rational actors who can forecast the likely effects of their design effort and choose whether or not to expend the effort Langlois, 1986b; Jensen and Meckling, 1994; Scott, 2001 ).
Our definition of viability is related to: the contracting view of economic organizations;
to the concept of solvency in finance; and to the concept of equilibrium in institutional game theory.
In contracting literature, firms and other organizations are viewed as a "nexus of contracts,", that is, a set of voluntary agreements (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983a, b; Demsetz, 1988; Hart, 1995) . For the firm or organization to continue in existence, each party must perceive himself or herself to be better off within the contracting relationship than outside of it.
In finance, a firm assembles resources by issuing claims (contracts) in the form of debt and equity. It uses the proceeds to purchase assets and to bridge the gap between cash outflows and inflows. A firm is solvent as long as it can pay off or refinance all its debt claims and have something left over. If this condition is not met, the firm is bankrupt: it ceases to be a going concern, and must be liquidated or reorganized.
In institutional game theory, an institution is defined as the equilibrium of a game with self-confirming beliefs (Aoki, 2001) . Within the institutional framework, participants join or contribute resources in the expectation that other parties will enact their respective roles. If all behave as the others expect, everyone's initial beliefs are confirmed: the pattern of action then becomes a self-perpetuating institution. When the participants in the institution are rational actors, one of their self-confirming beliefs must be, "I am better off participating in this institutional arrangement than withdrawing from it." On this view, a stable nexus of contracts, a solvent firm, and an active open collaborative innovation project are all special cases of institutional equilibria.
We define an innovation opportunity as the opportunity to create a new design. With respect to a particular innovation opportunity, each of the three models of innovation may be viable or not, depending on the benefits and costs flowing to the actors.
In terms of benefits, we define the value of an innovation, V, as the benefit that a party expects to gain from converting an innovation opportunity into a new design-the recipe-and then turning the design into a useful product, process or service. Different individuals and organizations may benefit in different ways. By definition, users benefit from direct use of the product, process, or service specified by the new design. Producers benefit from profitable sales, which may take the form of sales of intellectual property (a patent or license) or sales of products or services that embody the design. Ultimately, however, a producer's benefit, hence value, derives from the users' willingness to pay for the innovative design.
Each innovation opportunity has four generic costs: design cost, communication cost, production cost and transaction cost. Consistent with our assumption that innovators are rational actors, we assume that these costs (as well as benefits) are known ex ante to potential innovators, although there may be uncertainty in their assessments. As with value, the costs may differ both across individuals and across the three models of innovation.
Design cost, d, is the cost of creating the design for an innovation-the instructions that when implemented will bring the innovation into reality. Following Simon (1962 , these costs include (1) the cost of identifying the functional requirements (that is, what the design is supposed to do); (2) the cost of dividing the overall problem into sub-problems, which can be solved separately; (3) the cost of solving the sub-problems; and (4) the cost of recombining the sub-problems' solutions into a functioning whole. Production cost, u, is the cost of carrying out the design instructions to produce the specified good or service. The input is the design instructions -the recipe-plus the materials, energy, and human effort specified in those instructions; the output is a good-the design converted into usable form.
Transaction cost, t, is the cost of establishing property rights and engaging in compensated exchanges of property. For an innovation, transaction cost includes the cost of creating exclusive rights to the design, by keeping it secret or by obtaining a patent or copyright. It also includes the cost of controlling opportunistic behavior (Williamson, 1985) ; writing contracts (Hart, 1995) ; and accounting for transfers and compensation (Baldwin, 2008) .
Bounds on Viability
Every innovation opportunity, that is, every potential new design, can be characterized in terms of its value and the four dimensions of cost described above. The criterion of viability can thus be specified mathematically as follows: we have defined the criterion as a strict inequality: we assume that the actors must anticipate a strictly positive gain in order to undertake the effort and cost of innovation. We do not rule out the possibility that the activities of design, communication, production, or exchange might be pleasurable for some agents: if this is the case, the relevant cost would be negative for those agents. However, the cases of interest here are those for which the sum of costs is positive, that is to say, the innovation is not a free good.
Bounds on Viability 1: For a given innovation opportunity, a particular model of innovation is viable if and only if for each necessary contributor to the model:
As indicated in the introduction, design costs and communication costs have declined and are continuing to decline very rapidly because of the advent of personal computers and the Internet. We believe these largely exogenous technological trends are the main causes of the increasing importance of single user and open collaborative innovation models in the economy at large. To make this argument as clear as possible, we will first focus our analysis on these costs alone, holding production costs and transaction costs constant across all three economic models. Once we have established bounds on viability for the three models with respect to design and communication costs, we will reintroduce the other two dimensions of cost and show how they affect the results.
To simplify our notation in the next few sections, we define v as the value of an innovation opportunity net of production and transaction costs. Because it subtracts out production and transaction costs, v can be thought of as the (expected) value of the design alone, before it is put up for sale or converted into a useful thing. 
With this simplifying assumption, we can now represent innovation opportunities with different costs as points in a graph with design cost and communication cost on the x and y axes respectively. We next ask the question, for what combinations of design and communication cost will each model be viable?
Single User Innovation
Consider first a single user innovator -an individual or a firm -contemplating investment in a design whose value to her is v s . The effort of innovation is worthwhile (for this innovator and this design) if this value is greater than the user's design cost: d s < v s . In figure 1, we draw a vertical line at d = v s . Points to the left of the vertical line will satisfy the constraint hence be viable; those to the right will not. Thus the constraint d = v s bounds the region in which single user innovation is viable for this opportunity.
As advances in design technology progressively reduce design cost (which is the trend), more innovation opportunities become viable for more users. Note, however, that design costs of individual users will differ. For example, if user A has better skills or equipment than user B, the design cost for a given innovation may fall within an attractive range for user A but not B (as shown in the figure). 
Producer Innovation
Producers can economically justify undertaking larger designs than can single users, because they expect to spread their design costs over many purchasers. Even though they are single organizations, however, they are affected by communication costs because to sell their products they must make potential buyers aware of what they have to sell.
Non-innovating users will purchase the innovation from a producer as long as their value is greater than the producer's price: v i > p, where v i denotes the value of the innovation to the ith user, and p denotes the producer innovator's price. (Both value and price are measured net of production and transaction costs.)
As we mentioned earlier, we assume that if the producer undertakes a design effort, it will obtain property rights that give it some predictable degree of effective monopoly on the design. We also assume that the producer knows the value v i that each potential user places on the innovation. In other words it knows its customers' willingness-to-pay for the innovative product or service and can subtract the relevant production and transaction costs from their willingness-to-pay. The producer innovator can convert this customer knowledge into a demand function, Q(p), which relates each price it might charge to the number of units of the product or service it will sell at that price (Baldwin, Hienerth and von Hippel, 2006) . From the demand function, the producer innovator can solve for the price, p*, and quantity, Q*, that maximize its expected revenues (again net of production and transaction costs), and subtract its design (d p ) and communication (c p ) costs from (net) revenue to calculate expected profit, Π:
If the producer anticipates positive profit, then as a rational actor, it will enter the market to supply the innovation. In this case, the producer innovator model is viable with respect to the innovation opportunity. Conversely, if its anticipated profit is negative, the producer will not enter, and the producer model of innovation is not viable.
The zero profit constraint on the producer defines a negative 45-degree line in the space of design and communication costs: p * Q* = d + c . Figure 2 shows this bound in relation to a hypothetical single user innovator's bound for the same opportunity. As we have drawn the figure, the design costs are higher than the value of the innovation to a single user, hence the single user innovation model is not viable for this design. We then show two possible outcomes for the producer. In the first case, communication costs are low so that the sum of design and communication costs falls below the producer's bound. In the second case, the sum falls above the bound. Producer innovation is a viable model for the first combination of costs but not for the second.
Figure 2: Bound on Producer Innovation
From this analysis we learn that the viability of producer innovation is affected by two things that don't affect single user innovation. The first is the size of the potential market. In large markets, the producer will have many customers and its revenue will be far in excess of any single user's value: the producer is able to "aggregate demand." The need to communicate is the second factor differentiating producer innovators from single user innovators. We assume that member i has the option to communicate his portion of the design to other members and receive their feedback and complementary designs at a cost c. It makes sense for i to share his designs if he expects to receive more value from others than his communication cost. His expected benefit from communicating can be parsed into (1) the probability, ρ j that member j will respond in kind; (2) the fraction (α j ) of the remaining design that member j can provide; (3) the value v oi that i may obtain from others. As a rational actor, member i will communicate his design to the other members of the group, if: The second bound determines the maximum scale of the design. If there are N members of the group and each contributes his or her own part, the total design investment will be the sum of their individual design costs. The upper bound on design cost is then:
where v s is the average value each places on his or her own portion of the design. Note that this bound is N times greater than the bound on the design cost of the average single user innovator.
Thus given low-enough costs of communication, open collaborative user innovators operating
within a task-divisible and modular architecture can pursue much larger innovation opportunities than single user innovators acting alone.
Open collaborative projects, as we said earlier, may attract participants who are not in a position to benefit from the design produced by the project, but are instead motivated by such incentives as learning, reputation, and the fun of participation. For such contributors, the sum of their design cost and communication cost must be less than whatever benefit they do obtain from the project. Thus, instead of inequality (5), the non-user's (nu) criterion for contributing is "does my expected benefit -such as reputational benefits -exceed the sum of my design and
Other things equal, this bound is more likely to be satified if the non-users' communication costs are low. Thus communication costs constrain non-user participants as well as users.
The presence of non-users further relaxes the bound on the scale of the design. If there are M non-users in addition to N users contributing to the design, the upper bound on total design value is: part of the system is low or the expectation that others will actually contribute is low relative to the cost of communication, single user innovators will "stick to their knitting" and not attempt to collaborate, and non-user participants will find some other outlet for their talents. But if communication costs are low enough to clear these hurdles, then the second bound [(6) and (6')]
shows that, using a modular design architecture as a means of coordinating their work, a collaborative group can develop an innovative design that is many times larger in scale than any single member of the group could manage alone. 
Bringing Back Production and Transaction Costs
At the beginning of this section, in order to focus on the contrasting effects of design and communication costs on the three models of innovation, we made the simplifying assumption that production costs and transaction costs were similar across all three, and so had no effect on any model's viability relative to the other two. We did this by defining the value of the design (v i ) as the total value of the innovation to the innovator (V i ) minus the costs of production and transactions:
(Subscripts indicate that values and costs may differ across individuals and models.)
From this definition it is clear that if production costs or transaction costs are systematically higher for a particular model of innovation, then for the same willingness-to-pay (V i ), there will be less value in the design (v i ) to cover the "upstream" costs of design and communication. The range of viability for the model with higher costs is then reduced. In terms of the bounds derived above, the single user innovator's bound would move to the left, the producer's bound would move toward the origin; and the open colloborative project's bounds would move both down and left.
We now consider whether there are systematic differences in production or transaction costs across the three models.
Production Costs. At the start of this section, we explained that a design is the information required to produce a novel product or service -the "recipe." For products that themselves consist of information such as software, production costs are simply the cost of copying and instantiating the design. For digitized products and services, these costs are very low. In the case of a physical products, however, the design recipe must be converted into a physical form before it can be used. In such cases, the input is the design instructions -the recipe-plus the materials, energy, and human effort specified in those instructions; the output is a good-the design converted into usable form.
One of the major advantages producers have historically had over single user innovators and open collaborative innovation projects is, of course, economies of scale with respect to mass production technologies. Mass production, which became widespread in the early 20 th Century is a set of techniques whereby certain physical products can be turned out in very high volumes at very low unit cost (Chandler, 1977) . The economies of scale in mass production generally depend on using a single design (or a small number of designs) over and over again. In classic mass production, changing designs interrupts the flow of products and causes setup and switching costs, which reduce the overall efficiency of the process. There is no room for variety, as indicated by Henry Ford's famous quote, "[A] customer can have a car painted any color ... so long as it is black." (Ford, 1922, Chapter 4.) Can single user innovators or open collaborative innovation projects, convert their various designs into a physical products that will be economically competitive with the products of mass producers? Increasingly, the answer is 'Yes'. Consider that, today, modularization is affecting the interface between design and production, as well as the interfaces between design tasks. This means that mass producers can design their production technologies to be independent of many of the specifics of the designs they produce. Such processes are said to provide "mass customization" (Pine, 1993; Tseng and Piller, 2003) . When mass customization is possible-that is, when designs are no longer for technical reasons tied to production technologies-producers can in principle make their low-cost, high-throughput factories available for the production of designs created by single users and collaborative open projects.
Some producers might resist this idea, wanting to capture profits from a proprietary design as well as proprietary production capabilities. But, if there is competition among producers, some will be willing to produce outside designs as well as their own and forgo the rents they formerly obtained from proprietary designs. Indeed, this possibility is manifest in many industries where "toll" production is common. For example, "silicon fabs" produce custom designs to order via very sophisticated and expensive production processes, as do producers of specialty chemicals.
Nevertheless, even when it is technically feasible to modularize design and production, users might still value standardized goods and services that are reliably the same in different places and at different times. In effect, the value of innovation for such goods and services is low relative to the value of other attributes such as safety, familiarity, or guaranteed performance. Single user innovators and open collaborative innovation projects are not wellsuited to designing mass-produced products requiring product-specific production systems.
Thus we expect producer innovators to continue to have an advantage in designing and producing mass-produced goods and services for large numbers of people.
Transaction costs. If producer innovators have a production cost advantage for some (but not all) production technologies, free-revealing single user and open collaborative innovators have an advantage with respect to transaction costs. As indicated, the transaction costs of innovation include the cost of establishing exclusive rights over the innovative design, for example through secrecy or by obtaining a patent. Also included are the costs of protecting the design from theft: for example, by restricting access, and enforcing non-compete agreements (Teece, 2000; Marx, Strumky and Fleming, 2009 ). Finally transaction costs include the costs of legally transferring rights to the good or service embodying the innovation, receiving compensation, and protecting both sides against opportunism (Williamson, 1985; Baldwin, 2008) .
Producer innovators must incur transaction costs. By definition, they obtain revenue and resources from compensated exchanges with users, employees, suppliers, and investors. A considerable amount of analysis in the fields of economics, management, and strategy considers how to minimize transaction costs by rearranging the boundaries of firms or the structure of products and processes. (For reviews of this literature, see Williamson, 2000, and LaFontaine and Slade, 2007 .) The bottom line is that for producer innovators, transaction costs are an inevitable "cost of doing business."
Single user innovators incur transaction costs when they seek to assert exclusive rights over their innovative designs. Patents on internal processes and equipment, the enforcement of secrecy and "need-to-know" policies within a firm, and non-compete agreements with key employees are all visible evidence of transaction costs that single user innovators incur to protect valuable intellectual capital. In such cases, as rational actors, single user innovators would have to find a net gain after subtracting both design and transaction costs from the expected value of an innovative design to themselves.
However, single user innovators have a choice as to which innovations are worth protecting and which are not. As discussed in the literature review, empirical research suggests that single users innovators generally do not treat all or even most of their innovations as valuable property that must be sequestered within their walls. They often find it more practical and profitable to freely reveal their designs, in order to achieve network effects, reputational advantages, and other benefits. By definition, when single user innovators freely reveal an innovation, they do not incur transaction costs, and the region of viability for the innovation opportunity is thereby expanded.
Open collaborative innovation projects do not sell products nor do they pay members for their contributions. In this respect, they do not incur transaction costs of exchange. However, when an open collaborative project becomes large and successful, its members generally find that they must incur costs to protect the now-valuable design from malfeasance and expropriation. For example, virtually all large open source projects have a system of hierarchical access that prevents anyone from changing the master copy of the source code without authorization by a trusted member of the project. The General Public License (GPL) was explicitly designed to protect the rights of users to view, modify and distribute code derived 
Discussion
There is a widespread and longstanding perception among academics, policy makers and practitioners that producer innovation is the primary mode of innovation in market economies. In this view, innovations are undertaken by firms that can aggregate demand, or not at all. In the 1930s, Joseph Schumpeter placed producers at the center of his theory of economic development, saying: "It is … the producer who as a rule initiates economic change, and consumers are educated by him if necessary." (Schumpeter, 1934, p. 65.) Sixty years later, player in the development and commercialization of new products and processes" (Teece, 1996, p. 193; see also 2002, p. 36) . William Baumol placed innovation at the center of his theory of oligopolistic competition: "in major sectors of US industry, innovation has increasingly grown in relative importance as a instrument used by firms to battle their competitors" (Baumol, 2002, p. 35) .
However, like all human endeavors, the organizations and institutions that create innovations are historically contingent. They are solutions to the problems of a specific time and place using the technologies of that time and place. It is the case that, until quite recently, centralized groups within firms were the most economical way to design mass-produced products and related production processes. Four technological factors contributed to the preeminence of mass-produced products in the economy. First, computational resources were scarce thus the cost of creating individual designs was quite high. Second, there was a close tie between design of items to be produced and the complex requirements of mass production technologies. Third, modular design methods were not well understood. And fourth, cheap, rapid communication enabling distributed design among widely separated participants in a design process was not technically possible. Taken together, these factors made it cheaper to design mass-produced products centrally, and in conjunction with the manufacturing processes that would be used to produce them. Given these conditions, it is reasonable to speculate that (Rosenberg 1976; von Hippel 1976; Shah 2005) . However, they are growing more prominent today because of the largely exogenous technological developments just mentioned. Prior research allows us to elaborate on this basic pattern in several interesting ways, as we discuss next.
Interactions between the three models
From figure 3 it is evident that for some combinations of design and communication costs, two or even all three models of innovation will be viable. How will the presence of one influence the other(s)? In other words, how will the models interact?
When single user innovation and producer innovation are both viable, the single user innovators must evaluate an innovation opportunity, not only in relation to their design cost, but also in relation to the producer's product and price. If the producer offers a good-enough product at a low-enough price, purchasing the innovation may dominate developing it inhouse, and some single user innovators may switch to becoming customers of the producer.
(This happens regularly when companies switch from custom software developed by an inhouse IT department to off-the-shelf, purchased software.) To attract users who can innovate on their own, a producer's price must be less than the user's design cost, which by definition is less than the user's value: p < d s < v s . Given users with a range of design capabilities and costs, rational producers are likely to target as customers users with high design costs, and leave single user innovators to work out their own solutions.
Because of their distinct roles, it is possible for producer innovators and single user innovators to have a symbiotic relationship. Empirical studies have shown that most single user innovation is done by a subset of all users called "lead users" that are ahead of the bulk of the market with respect to an important trend and also have a high incentive to innovate to solve needs they encounter at the leading edge (von Hippel 1986) . Often, lead users have no interest in commercializing their innovations. However, these innovations may serve as an attractive source of field-tested product prototypes for producers. By monitoring and incorporating lead user innovations into their own offerings, producer innovators may enhance their product and service offerings, while at the same time reducing their design costs and increasing their likelihood of success in the marketplace (Lilien et al 2002 , von Hippel 2005 (Baldwin, 2008; Henkel and Baldwin, 2009 ).
Hybrid innovation models
Hybrids of the three basic models thrive in the real world. This is because the architecture of a design to achieve a given function can often take a number of forms -and different architectures may be suited to development by one or a combination of our three basic models. For example, producers or users can choose to modularize a product architecture into a mix of large, monolithic elements suitable for investment only by producers, plus many smaller However, to date, the cpu chips themselves have been developed as monolithic projects by single producers such as Intel (Colwell, 2005) . Another example is the development of software "engines" for computer games by producer firms, upon which platform individual gamers or groups of gamers acting collaboratively develop "mods" (Jeppesen 2004 ). 
Implications for social welfare
New knowledge is a non-rival, partially excludable good (Romer, 1990) . The use of a design by one person does not inherently preclude its use by others. With rare exceptions such as the design of dangerous goods, society benefits if designs are public goods, available to anyone to use or study at no charge (Machlup and Penrose, 1950; Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962) .
However, from the time of the Enlightenment, many have held the view that providing inventors with incentives in the form of property rights to their "writings and discoveries"
would induce them to invest in the creation of useful new ideas, i.e., innovations. This theory was expressed in the U.S. Constitution, which sanctioned the creation of intellectual property: Of course, it was also known that grants of intellectual property rights would create undesirable monopolies. Producers create deadweight losses when they exploit intellectual property rights to reap monopoly profits and spend money to protect or extend their monopoly positions. Indeed while a system of intellectual property rights was enshrined in the U.S.
Constitution, patent systems were extremely controversial in Europe during the second half of the 19 th century. (Machlup and Penrose, 1950; Penrose, 1951; MacLeod, 2007.) The work in this paper and that of many others, suggests that this traditionally-struck 'devil's bargain' may not be beneficial. First, there is increasing evidence that intellectual property protection does not increase innovation. As we saw in section 2.2, studies carried out over 40 years do not find that firm managers are inclined to increase their innovation investments due to the availability of patent grant protections. There are also many examples in which strong intellectual property rights may have impeded subsequent progress (Dosi, Marengo and Pasquali, 2006; Merges and Nelson, 1994) . Indeed, recent empirical work has actually shown a negative relationship between patenting and subsequent progress in both biotechnology (Murray and Stern 2007) and software (Bessen and Meurer 2008 
Implications for government policy
If Sponsors of collaborative projects can close and own the innovative output of a collaborative project if they can create a project that escapes these two constraints. To escape the first, sponsors can create incentives that will attract non-user contributors to their project.
For example, they can offer payment, or process-related rewards such as learning or fun (Raymond, 1999; Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Lakhani and Wolf, 2005; Benkler 2006 (Lessig 2001 ). It will be important for policy makers to be aware of this kind of incentive problem and address it-in this case perhaps by mandating "net neutrality," or that ownership of content and ownership of channel be separated, as has long been the case for other types of common carriers (Zittrain 2009 ).
We conclude by observing again that we belive we are in the midst of a major paradigm shift: technological trends are causing a change in the way innovation gets done in advanced market economies. As design and communication costs exogenously decline, single user and open collaborative innovation models will be viable for a steadily wider range of design. They will present an increasing challenge to the traditional paradigm of producer-based design -but, when open, they are good for social welfare and should be encouraged.
